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Abstract
Analysis of yield gaps were conducted in the context of crop insurance and used to build an indicator of asymmetric information. 
The possible influence of asymmetric information in the decision of Spanish wheat producers to contract insurance was additionally 
evaluated. The analysis includes simulated yield using a validated crop model, CERES-Wheat previously selected among others, whose 
suitability to estimate actual risk when no historical data are available was assessed. Results suggest that the accuracy in setting the 
insured yield is decisive in farmers’ willingness to contract crop insurance under the wider coverage. Historical insurance data, when 
available, provide a more robust technical basis to evaluate and calibrate insurance parameters than simulated data, using crop models. 
Nevertheless, the use of crop models might be useful in designing new insurance packages when no historical data is available or to 
evaluate scenarios of expected changes. In that case, it is suggested that yield gaps be estimated and considered when using simulated 
attainable yields.
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Introduction
Developing efficient agricultural insurance requires 
overcoming a number of market imperfections and 
combating asymmetric information. Very often, 
these difficulties justify governments’ intervention 
in promoting insurance demand through the 
implementation of public incentives, such as 
premium subsidies, and a significant degree of market 
intervention, guidance and overseeing (Mahul & 
Stutley, 2010).
Asymmetric information occurs when insured 
farmers have more information than the insurer about 
their actual risk and behaviour, and results in two 
behavioural responses: moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Moral hazard occurs when farmers’ expected 
indemnity under insurance is larger than under 
optimal uninsured conditions (Coble et al., 1997). 
This means that farmers might modify their behaviour 
after contracting insurance in order to increase the 
probability of being indemnified (Goodwin, 1994) or 
reduce the effort to escape risk once they are covered 
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for it. Adverse selection happens when high-risk 
farmers contract insurance in greater numbers than low-
risk farmers. The insurer, being unable to differentiate 
them, is forced to average out the risks of both types 
in calculating the premium. In these situations, the 
insurer does not have adequate information to calculate 
the unbiased probability and severity of claims. The 
result can be unbalanced loss ratios, thereby affecting 
the actuarial robustness and sustainability of entire 
insurance systems.
Yield gaps are defined in agronomy as the differences 
between attainable yields based on climate and soil 
conditions and actual farmers’ yields; they are usually 
defined with reference to some specified spatial and 
temporal scale (Lobell et al., 2009). Quantifying such 
gaps is useful to identify suboptimal crop management 
and the opportunity for the agronomic improvement 
of productivity (e.g. Lobell et al., 2009; Affholder et 
al., 2012; van Wart et al., 2013). Yield gap has been 
proven to be a valuable concept for assessing and 
understanding the ecological possibilities to meet food 
demand for an increasing population (van Ittersum et 
al., 2013). Nevertheless, the use of this concept is not 
limited to the biophysical aspects of agronomy, but 
may also be used to support research on socioeconomic 
aspects of agricultural production. Examples are seen in 
the limits to technology adoption due to either technical 
constraints or for economic issues arising from market 
conditions (Godfray et al., 2010). In the context of crop 
insurance, a conceptual variation of yield gap might 
be also defined as the difference between insured and 
actual yields. Such a gap indicates either a deficiency 
in the insurer’s knowledge or an information advantage 
of the farmer. Either situation is a case of asymmetric 
information. The lack of data on actual yields is very 
often the main cause of this asymmetry (Mahul & 
Stutley, 2010). Crop models can be used generate data 
on expected yields for risk analyses and failure studies 
in the crop insurance market when no historical data are 
available.
This paper presents analyses of yield gaps in the 
context of crop insurance, and the possible influence 
of asymmetric information in the decision of a farmer 
to contract insurance. A novel method to measure 
asymmetric information was designed based on yield 
gaps and applied to wheat insurance in the region of 
Castilla y León (northern central Spain). The analysis 
includes simulated yield data using the CERES-
Wheat crop model in order to assess the suitability 
of such models to estimate actual yield risk when no 
historical data are available. The aims of the study were 
to (i) quantify the gap between actual wheat yields 
and the yield data managed by the insurer, (ii) obtain 
indicators providing evidence of potential asymmetric 
information in wheat insurance, (iii) explore the impact 
of asymmetric information on the decision of farmers 
to contract insurance, and (iv) evaluate the use of a crop 
model within the context of crop insurance.
Material and methods
Winter cereal insurance
In Spain, multi-peril insurance for cereal farmers 
has offered since 1982. The database for this study 
pertains to crop seasons 2010-11 and 2011-12 and 
includes four insurance modules (P, 1, 2 and S) that 
were available to cereal farmers. Module S has not 
been offered since 2013. The modules differ based on 
the coverage, on whether the crop is grown rainfed 
or irrigated, on the way indemnities are calculated 
when a loss occurs (whether indemnities are paid for 
each individual field or for the whole farm), and on 
the maximum insurable yield guaranteed (Table S1 
[suppl.]). Two types of risks are defined. Type A risks 
include hail, fire, crop damage caused by wild fauna, 
flood and excessive rainfall. Type B risks include 
adversities impeding crop emergence (no-emergence 
risks) or limiting crop growth (including drought).
For irrigated crops, losses associated to both risk 
types A and B are indemnified per plot if the final yield 
is lower than the insured yield, the latter being freely 
set by the farmer. Under rainfed conditions, however, 
losses associated to type B risks can be indemnified 
per plot (Module 2) or per farm (Modules 1 and S). 
In the latter case the farmer is indemnified only if the 
average yield of all farm plots is lower than the insured 
yield, and farmers are obliged to insure all farm plots. 
Module S limits insured yield to a maximum officially 
assigned by the Spanish Agency of Agricultural 
Insurance (ENESA, initials in Spanish). Modules 
1 and 2 limit insured yield to a maximum insurable 
yield calculated for individual farmers based on their 
insurance history records. Lastly, farmers might select 
a deductible, but most of them usually opt for the 
lowest of 30%.
To simplify the analysis, the four modules (P, 1, 2 
and S) were combined into two options based on the 
risks covered. The first option, called Basic, comprises 
module P that guarantees farmers’ production with 
coverage for type A risks. The second option, called 
Extended, includes modules 1, 2 and S, and provides 
coverage for risks of both type A and type B. Farmers 
choosing the Extended option may increase insured 
yield at midseason with a complementary insurance 
payment if yield expectation exceeds that insured 
before sowing.
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Crop insurance premiums are proportional to insured 
yields and vary depending on the contracted module 
and deductible. They are subsidized by the national and 
regional governments. The subsidy varies depending on 
the option contracted, the farmer’s characteristics (age, 
gender and others), and whether the contract is a renewal 
or is contracted through a farmer association. The lowest 
base subsidy is for module P (option Basic) increasing 
for modules S, 2 and 1 (option Extended) as 1, 8, 17 and 
22% of the premium cost. Additional subsidies based on 
the farmer’s characteristics (young farmers, gender and 
others), and whether it is contracted collectively through a 
farmer association are also different for different modules, 
in such a way that Module P (option Basic) has the lower 
maximum assignable subsidy followed by Module S, 
Module 2, and lastly Module 1 (option Extended) with 16, 
33, 52 and 57 % of the premium cost (Table S1 [suppl.]).
Study site
Spain is the fifth largest producer of cereals in Europe, 
with a harvested production that ranged between 14 and 
25.5 million Mg (6.2 Mha of crop) between 2000 and 
2013 (Eurostat, 2013). About 47% of the cultivated land 
dedicated to arable crops (including cereal) is located in 
Castilla y León region, with about 2.9 Mha (ESYRCE, 
2013).
Castilla y León (CyL) is located in northern central 
Spain. Climate is continental Mediterranean with warm 
and dry summers and cold and wet winters. It is a high 
plateau (830 masl average) around the Duero river basin 
surrounded by mountain ranges. There is a clear gradient 
of temperature and rainfall from North-East (cooler and 
wetter) to South-West (warmer and drier).
The most commonly cultivated cereals are barley 
(Hordeum vulgare) and bread wheat (Triticum aestivum), 
with 54% and 30% of total regional production, 
respectively. Wheat is mainly grown without irrigation 
(JCyL, 2014) so that yields respond to the high rainfall 
variability (240 to 700 mm). Average rainfed yields 
in the study region during 2000–2013 varied between 
2.0 and 4.5 Mg/ha (JCyL, 2014). Winter wheat is sown 
during October–December and spring wheat during 
February–March. Wheat is harvested between late June 
and mid-August. The most sensitive phenological stages 
to meteorological adversities are flowering (April-May, 
late frosts, drought and heat stress) and grain filling (June-
July, heat and drought).
Actual, expected, insured and water limited yields
Actual and expected yields
Actual yields (Ya) were obtained from the ESYRCE 
database (Encuesta sobre Superficies y Rendimientos 
de Cultivos), which originates from a yearly survey 
started in 1995 (MAGRAMA, 2014). The sample of 
farms is selected from a 1 km × 1 km grid. Surveys are 
performed at the farm level and include information on 
cultivated area, average yield per crop, crop varieties, 
management practices, farm infrastructure and others. 
The original database comprised 121,309 yield 
observations, distributed across the study region (CyL). 
After aggregation at municipality level, the database for 
the present analysis contained 7879 yield observations.
Expected yields (Yexp) prior to sowing and for each 
of the counties were estimated assuming a linear trend 
from the seasonal adjusted Ya series for the following 
year. Yexp includes spatial variability of the mean 
expected yield in 531 municipalities across the study 
region, in 2011 and 2012.
Insurance-related yields
A database from all municipalities in CyL with at 
least one insured farmer in 2011 or 2012 was made 
available by ENESA for 107,709 insurance policies 
over these two years, contracted in 452 municipalities 
(belonging to a total of 38 counties). Each record 
includes information on the number of sold policies, 
total insured production and area, and insured yield per 
crop insurance module. These records were aggregated 
by county, year, and insurance module.
The zonal maximum insurable yield (per 
municipality) for wheat grown under rainfed conditions 
for each municipality is published every year in the 
Spanish Official Gazette (BOE). The ones used for 
this study were published in BOE (2013). These data 
were aggregated by county to define the average zonal 
maximum insurable yield (YinsZ).
Three other insurance-related yields were defined 
for the insurance options Basic and Extended, the latter 
including the complementary insurance of the option, 
as described in the previous section:
- YinsB is the average yield insured in the option 
Basic, the yield expected before sowing that is freely 
set by the farmer.
- YinsE is the average yield insured in the option 
Extended (Module 1, Module 2 and Module S), yield 
insured by the farmers before sowing and is limited to 
an individual maximum insurable yield.
- At midseason, farmers have the option of 
contracting a complementary insurance policy, in which 
the insured yield is adjusted according to farmer’s yield 
expectations at that time of season (YinsEC).
YinsZ is defined at county level (as it does not vary 
from a year to another) and YinsB, YinsE and YinsEC are 
defined per year and per county.
YinsZ includes spatial variability, including 531 
municipalities in the study region. YinsB, YinsE and 
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in optimal rainfed growing conditions, being soil 
water availability the solely limiting factor. Crop 
data belonging to the cultivar Marius (T. aestivum cv. 
Marius) were selected to calibrate the crop model. This 
cultivar is commonly used by farmers in this region. 
Being used as a test cultivar, it was sown in each of 
the trials every year. Crop development data such as 
emergence, anthesis and physiological maturity dates, 
sowing dates and plant density, and yield were available 
(Table S2 [suppl.]).
Soil texture and depth maps were obtained from 
the ITACyL (Agro-Technological Institute in Castilla 
y León) soil website (http://suelos.itacyl.es/mapas) to 
simulated rainfed yields. Three soil textures (sandy, 
loam and clayey, Fig. 1A) and two depth-types (1.0 m 
and 0.3 m, Fig. 1B) were defined (Table S3 [suppl.]). 
Three maps with polygons defining depth, soil texture 
and climate zones were built using ESRI ArcMap 10.0 
GIS and combined into a single map. Different climate 
zones were selected assuming that accumulated rainfall 
and evapotranspiration are main driving variables for 
crop growth under rainfed conditions. Accumulated 
rainfall and evapotranspiration are aggregated in 
Thornthwaite’s aridity index (Thornthwaite, 1948). 
The map based on Thornthwaite’s aridity index in the 
Agroclimatic Atlas of Castilla y León (Álvarez-Arias 
YinsEC include spatial and temporal variability (2 years) 
of insured yield data aggregated at municipality level 
using the mean insured yield in each of the insurance 
options in the same 531 municipalities.
Attainable rainfed yields
Attainable rainfed yields (Yw) were simulated using 
the crop model CERES–Wheat (Godwin et al., 1989). 
CERES–Wheat as available in the package Decision 
Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) 
vers. 4.5 (Jones et al., 2003; Hoogenboom et al., 2012). 
CERES–Wheat has been widely applied at the regional 
scale (e.g. Bannayan et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 2011) and 
preferred for the simulation of winter wheat growth 
at field scale in semi-arid conditions in Spain after a 
detailed comparison (Castañeda-Vera et al., 2015).
CERES-Wheat was first calibrated and validated 
using published data from the trials conducted by 
the Agricultural Research Program of CyL 2004 
and 2010 (Table S2 [suppl.]), following Castañeda-
Vera et al. (2015). The experimental sites are widely 
spread throughout the grain production areas and are 
representative of its climate and soil variability. The 
objective of these trials was to monitor the attainable 
rainfed production of different wheat cultivars. 
Therefore, they are assumed to have been grown 
Figure 1. (A) Soil texture, (B) soil depth, (C) Thornthwaite aridity index and (D) soil texture-
depth-climate zones in the study region (Castilla y León, northern central Spain). Adapted from 
the Agroclimatic Atlas of Castilla-y-León (Álvarez-Arias et al., 2013).
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et al., 2013) was used to assign a climate zone to each 
sub-area (Fig. 1C). Recorded weather data assigned to 
each climate zone was obtained from the System of 
Agroclimatic Information for Irrigated crops (SiAR), 
covering 14 years (2000-2013) (Table S4 [suppl.]). 
The map contained polygons assigned with a number 
defining a single combination of soil texture-depth-
climate zone (Fig. 1D).
Models’ statistical performance was evaluated using 
the root mean square error (RMSE) (Eq [1]):
   [1]
where Si and Oi are the simulated and observed yields, 
respectively, and n is the number of observations used.
The model was run for each combination of soil 
texture-depth-climate zone in the region. CERES-
Wheat simulates wheat biomass production (dry 
matter). Simulated yields were converted into yields at 
harvest assuming 13% humidity in order to make them 
comparable with actual, expected and insured yields. 
Average simulated rainfed yields (13% humidity) (Yw) 
were assigned to the corresponding polygon in the map.
Yw includes spatial and temporal variability of 
simulated attainable rainfed yield data aggregated 
at municipality level using the mean yield in 531 
municipalities all along the study region and per year 
(2000-2013).
Yield gap analysis
Five yield gaps (GapZ, GapB, GapE, GapEC, GapW) 
were defined by the following yield differences:
GapZ=YinsZ-Yexp    [2]
GapB=YinsB-Yexp   [3]
GapE=YinsE-Yexp   [4]
GapEC=YinsEC-Yexp   [5]
GapW=Yw-Yexp   [6]
where Yexp is the county average expected yield; YinsZ 
is the county average zonal maximum insurable yield; 
YinsB is the county average insured yield in the option 
Basic per year, and YinsE, YinsEC are the county average 
insured yield each year in the option Extended before 
and after contracting the complementary insurance, 
respectively. Lastly, Yw is the county average simulated 
attainable rainfed yield.
YinsZ is considered to have a perfect fit when it is 
equal to Ya; indicating that the insurance system would 
have a perfect knowledge of the actual average yield in 
the region. Therefore, GapZ was assessed as a measure 
of the accuracy of the insurance parameter YinsZ. GapB, 
GapE and GapEC indicate the distance between insured 
and expected yields; they were evaluated as preliminary 
indicators of asymmetric information for each of the 
insurance options, reflecting farmer’s information 
advantage with respect to the insurer. GapE and GapEC 
were also contrasted in order to evaluate how farmers 
increase insured yield when uncertainty decreases 
(insured before sowing vs. insured at midseason). Lastly, 
GapW provides insight into how similar or dissimilar 
simulated rainfed yields are from expected yields, 
indicating the appropriateness of using crop models 
simulated data in crop insurance parameterization.
Asymmetric information
An asymmetric information indicator was obtained 
as the difference between the probability of indemnity 
based on the risk expected by the insurer, in which 
possible asymmetric information is assumed, and the one 
based on the actual risk (no asymmetric information). 
The procedure to calculate the asymmetric information 
indicator is illustrated in Fig. 2. The likeliness of 
indemnity was calculated as the probability of the actual 
yields being lower than a threshold yield (ythres) (Eq [7], 
Fig. 2A).
   [7]
A probability density function of actual yields, f(Ya), 
left-truncated at zero, was fitted for each of the counties 
using the software package @-Risk (Palisade Corp., 
2011), selecting the distribution with the lowest Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) statistic. Threshold yield 
(ythres) was defined as the insured yield (YinsB, YinsE or 
YinsEC) after subtracting a 30% deductible, as this is the 
most common deductible level selected by the farmers. 
To compute the probability of indemnity based on the 
actual risk (non-asymmetric information), ythres was 
calculated from the average actual yield f(Ya) (Ýa)(Fig. 
2B). For the insurance options Basic and Extended, ythres 
was calculated from the average insured yields (YinsB, 
YinsEC) (shown in Fig. 2C for YinsEC).
Lastly, the asymmetric information indicator was 
defined for the insurance options Basic (AsymB) and 
Extended before (AsymE) and after contracting the 
complementary insurance (AsymEC), as shown in Eqs 




where AsymB and AsymEC are the differences between 
the probability of indemnity based on the insured yields 
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(ythres = 0.7×YinsB; and ythres = 0.7×YinsEC) and the one 
based on observed actual yields (ythres = 0.7×Ýa).
Factors influencing insurance demand
Yield gaps and asymmetric information can 
potentially influence farmers’ insurance demand. 
Statistical analyses were performed to test their 
significance in explaining insurance penetration rates. 
In this work, insurance demand at the county level is 
thus an aggregation of all farmers’ individual decisions 
about whether insuring or not.
A factor analysis was performed in order to constrain 
explanatory information to non-correlated variables to 
be used later on in a regression model exploring the 
influence on insurance demand.
For that, in a first step, the suitability of data for factor 
analysis was evaluated using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) test. The value of KMO was 0.743, enough 
to conclude that data was suitable for such analysis 
(Kaiser, 1974). Second, the number of extracted factors 
was determined using the eigenvalues. We found that 
restraining factors with eigenvalue higher than 1 was 
too restrictive for such a model with a high number of 
variables. Therefore, we used the alternative approach 
of creating a scree plot (graphing the eigenvalues of 
all factors listing them in decreasing order of their 
eigenvalue) and restraining the number of factors 
above the inflection point (Cattell, 1966). The resulting 
number of factors was 4. Lastly, factor loadings were 
computed by an iterated principal factors’ algorithm 
until convergence and rotated using the varimax 
rotation method.
Factor analysis permitted selecting a single variable 
from each group (the one with the higher loading). 
Selected variables were used as independent variables 
in two linear regression models fitted to investigate 
the impact of yield gaps and county wheat production 
characteristics on the decision of farmers in a given 
county and year to insure their wheat production 
(Insuredwheat) and the proportion of insured area under 
the option basic (InsuredB / Insuredwheat ). The variable 
Insuredwheat was calculated as the fraction of total wheat 
cultivated area (JCyL, 2014) that was actually insured 
in any of the insurance modules, per county and year. 
It thus represents an index of insurance penetration 
measured at the county level. Models were fitted with 
Stata v12 (StataCorp, 2011).
Figure 2. Procedure to calculate the asymmetric information indicator: (A) the probability of 
indemnity calculated as the cumulative probability of yield being lower than a threshold yield 
(ythres), (B) the probability of indemnity with no asymmetric information where ythres is the 
average actual yield after subtracting a 30% deductible, (C) the probability of indemnity with 
asymmetric information for the insurance option Extended including the complementary in-
surance (AsymEC), where where ythres is the average insured yield in insurance option EC after 
subtracting a 30% deductible,and lastly, (D) the asymmetric information indicator calculated 
as the difference between (C) and (B).
Crop insurance demand in wheat production
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research December 2017 • Volume 15 • Issue 4 • e0119
7
Results
CERES-Wheat model calibration and validation
The calibrated crop parameters reproduce a wheat 
cultivar with high vernalization requirements (60 
days), and intermediate photoperiod sensitivity (105 % 
reduction in rate per 10 h drop in photoperiod), a short 
grain filling period (400 °C-days), and an intermediate 
phyllochron for wheat (95°C-days). Parameters related 
to potential biomass production were 19.5 kernels 
per unit canopy weight (# g−1), 30.5 kg grain weight, 
and 2.59 g per standard, non-stressed mature tiller, 
including grain (Table S5 [suppl.]). Table S5 [suppl.] 
shows observed and simulated data and the RMSE 
for phenology and grain yield for cultivar Marius. 
For calibration and validation, RMSE for anthesis and 
physiological maturity were 2.6 and 6.5, and 11.5 and 
9.9 days, respectively. For grain yield, RMSE were 0.4 
and 0.9 Mg/ha.
Yields and yield gap analysis
Figures 3 and 4 show the kernel density estimation 
of yields and yield gaps including all counties defined 
within this work. In both cases, they were estimated 
using Stata v12 and the Epanechnikov kernel. The 
y-axis has the units and dimensions of the reciprocal of 
the variable in the x-axis. Thus, density is not measured 
on a probability scale, and therefore it might exceed 1. 
Figure 3 shows the kernel density estimation of the 
zonal maximum insurable yield (YinsZ), expected yield 
(Yexp), and water limited yields (Yw) (Fig. 3A), and 
the GapZ and GapW gaps, (Fig. 3B). The lowest yields 
were YinsZ, followed by Yexp and lastly, Yw, with the 
mean values at 1.96, 2.77 and 3.78 Mg/ha, respectively 
(Table 1, Fig. 3A). The largest variability was found 
for Yw, followed by Yexp and lastly YinsZ (Fig. 3A). 
GapZ had the mean at -0.85 Mg/ha and a low variability 
(percentiles 10 and 90, being -1.45 and -0.37 Mg/ha, 
respectively), while GapW had a mean of 1.01 Mg/ha 
and a high variability (percentiles 10 and 90, -0.36 and 
2.13 Mg/ha, respectively) (Table 1 and Fig. 3B).
Fig. 4A represents the kernel density estimation of 
expected yields (Yexp), and the farmers’ insured yield 
before sowing with option Basic (YinsB), before sowing 
in the option Extended (YinsE), and at midseason 
insured with option Extended and adjusted with the 
complementary insurance (YinsEC). Fig. 4B shows 
the gaps GapB, GapE, and GapEC. The lowest yields 
were YinsE, followed by Yexp, YinsB and lastly, YinsEC, 
with the mean at 2.22, 2.77, 3.54 and 3.63 Mg/ha, 
respectively (Table 1, Fig. 4A). GapE was the lowest, 
and had a negative mean at -0.56 Mg/ha, followed by 
GapB with a positive mean at 0.75 Mg/ha, and lastly 
GapEC with the mean at 0.86 Mg/ha (Table 1).
Asymmetric information
To calculate the probabilities of indemnity (Eq [7]) 
and the asymmetric information indicators (Eqs. [8], 
[9] and 10]), probability density distribution functions 
were fitted for actual yields, f(Ya), in each of the 38 
counties in the studied region. Out of the 38 distribution 
functions fitted, 12 were Weibull, 11 Triangular, 4 
Gamma, 7 BetaGeneral, 2 Logistic and lastly, 2 Logistic 
distributions. Such distributions have been used earlier 
for crop yield modelling (Gallagher, 1987; Nelson & 
Preckel, 1989; Atwood et al., 2003; Sherrick et al., 
2004; Tolhurst & Ker, 2015). Results of these density 
fits are available from the authors upon request.
Fig. 5 shows the kernel density estimation of 
the probability of indemnity (Fig. 5A) and the 
asymmetric information indicator (Fig. 5B). Again, 
the kernel density was estimated using Statav12 and 
the Epanechnikov kernel. The lowest probability 
Figure 3. Kernel density estimation of yields and yield gaps: (A) Zonal maximum insurable yields (YinsZ), 
expected yields (Yexp) and water-limited yields (Yw); and (B) maximum insurable yields to expected 
yields gaps (GapZ) and water-limited to expected yields gaps (GapW).
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Table 1. Notation, description and descriptive statistics of yields and yield gaps used within the yield gap analysis and the 
asymmetric information and insurance demand model for winter wheat in Castilla y León. Data is aggregated from the 
original data base of observations per county.
Variable Definition N Mean Min p10
Areawheat (1000 
ha)1
Area cultivated with wheat in a given year and municipality 79 0.50 0.03 0.17
Rainfed (fraction) Fraction of the wheat area cultivated under rainfed conditions 79 0.91 0.30 0.78
Ya (Mg/ha) Actual rainfed yield 79 2.76 1.29 2.18
CVYa (–) Coefficient of variation of actual yields under rainfed conditions 
(1995-2013)
79 0.09 0.02 0.03
SkewnessYa (–) Skewness of actual yields under rainfed conditions (1995-2013) 79 0.08 -1.61 -1.11
Yexp (Mg/ha) Expected rainfed yield 79 2.77 1.28 2.20
YinsZ (Mg/ha) Zonal maximum insurable yield 79 1.96 1.10 1.48
GapZ (Mg/ha) Gap between YinsZ and the expected yield under rainfed 79 -0.85 -3.21 -1.41
Yw (Mg/ha) Simulated attainable rainfed yield 79 3.78 2.43 2.99
GapW (Mg/ha) Gap between Yw and Yexp 79 1.01 -1.37 -0.36
YinsB (Mg/ha) Average insured yield in option Basic 76 3.54 2.22 2.89
GapB (Mg/ha) Gap between YinsB and Yexp 76 0.75 -0.76 -0.16
YinsE (Mg/ha) Average insured yield in option Extended before sowing 79 2.22 1.17 1.65
GapE (Mg/ha)1 Gap between YinsE and Yexp 79 -0.56 -2.59 -1.09
YinsEC (Mg/ha) Average insured yield in option Extended including the comple-
mentary insurance
79 3.63 1.82 3.29
GapEC (Mg/ha) Gap between YinsEC and Yexp 79 0.86 -1.61 0.41
Insuredwheat (-) Fraction of the area cultivated with wheat insured in a given year 
and a given county
79 0.26 0.02 0.17
InsuredB (-) Fraction of the area cultivated with wheat insured in the option 
Basic in a given year and a given county
76 0.10 0.00 0.01
InsuredE (-) Fraction of the area cultivated with wheat insured in the option 
Extended in a given year and a given county
79 0.17 0.01 0.05
AsymB (-) Asymmetric information indicator for the insurance option Basic 75 0.17 -0.10 -0.03
AsymE (-) Asymmetric information indicator for the insurance option 
Extended
78 -0.08 -0.26 -0.13
AsymEC (-) Asymmetric information indicator for the insurance option 
Extended including the complementary insurance
78 0.22 -0.10 0.07
1Variables included in the insurance demand models (in bold).
Figure 4. Kernel density estimation of insured yields and yield gaps: (A) expected yields (Yexp) and 
farmer’s insured yields before sowing in option Basic (YexpB), before sowing in option Extended (YinsE), 
and adjusted at mid-season in option Extended (YinsEC), and (B) gaps between farmer’s insured yields 
before sowing in option Basic and expected yields (GapB), before sowing in option Extended and expected 
yields (GapE), and the adjusted yields at mid-season in option Extended to expected yields (GapEC). 
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of indemnity was found when using the average 
insured yield for the option Extended before sowing 
(ythres=YinsE), even lower than when no asymmetric 
information was considered (ythres=average Ya). The 
probability of indemnity when using the average 
insured yield was higher for the option Extended 
including the complementary insurance (at mid-
season, ythres=YinsEC) than for the option Basic 
(ythres=YinsB) (Table 1, Fig. 5A). The probability of 
indemnity when no asymmetric information was 
considered (ythres=average Ya) showed the lowest 
variability. Consequently, the asymmetric information 
indicator was higher for the option Extended including 
the complementary insurance (ythres=YinsEC) than for 
the option Basic (ythres=YinsB), and both higher than the 
option Extended before sowing (ythres=YinsE) (Table 1, 
Fig. 5B).
Insurance demand, yield gaps and asymmetric 
information
Table 2 shows the four factors of the factor analysis 
including loadings and the percentage of variance 
of each of them, once rotated. Position of relevant 
variables determines the factors influencing the 
demand of wheat insurance in the study region. As a 
result, 49.5% of the variance is explained by factor 1 
variables, defined as "Expectations" in Table 2. Factor 
2 variables “Yield asymmetric information” explains 
19.5%, factor 3 variables “Yield variability” 17.5 % 
and lastly, factor 4 “Commercial effort”, 13.5%.
Factor 1 grouped three variables (GapZ, GapW 
and AsymEC) indicating a high correlation between 
them. Higher yield gaps between expected yields 
and maximum insurable yield (GapZ) and attainable 
rainfed yields (GapW) are then correlated with 
higher asymmetric information for the insurance 
option Extended when including the complementary 
insurance (AsymEC). This makes sense because when 
the farmer sets YinsEC, the certainty on final yields 
is higher at mid-season. GapZ was selected as the 
representative variable of factor 1 to be included in the 
regression models.
Two regression models were fitted using the most 
representative variables of each of the four factors 
to explain wheat insurance penetration and the 
prevalence of the insurance option Basic (Insuredwheat 
and InsuredB / Insuredwheat). Explanatory variables 
were, therefore, Areawheat, GapZ, CV_Ya and AsymB. 
Table 3 shows the model parameters estimates of each 
of the explanatory variables and the significance of 
their contribution to explain the dependent variable, 
number of observations (N), and the coefficient of 
determination (R2adj).
The results show that wheat insurance demand 
(Insuredwheat) was higher in counties with higher 
wheat cultivated area (Areawheat), higher GapZ and 
lower asymmetric information for contracts in option 
Basic (AsymB). At the same time, counties with a 
higher AsymB tend to have a higher proportion of 
insured area under the option Basic. Greater interest in 
contracting crop insurance would be expected in those 
counties with higher yield variability (higher CVYa) 
and in which crop yield distributions are skewed to 
the left (lower SkewnessYa), with yields closer to the 
maximum observed more frequently than very low 
yields. However, model results discarded CVYa as an 
influencing factor on insurance demand.
Figure 5. Kernel density estimation of the probability of indemnity and the asymmetric information indicator: (A) 
Frequency distribution of the probability of indemnity being ythres calculated from average actual yield (solid line, Ya), 
from the farmers’ insured yields in option extended adjusted at mid-season (dashed grey line, YinsEC) and from the 
farmers’ insured yields in option Basic before sowing insured (dotted line, YinsB); and (B) Frequency distribution of 
the asymmetric information indicator for farmers’ insured yields in option Basic before sowing (dotted line, AsymB), 
and the asymmetric information indicator for farmers’ insured yields in option Extended adjusted at including the 
complementary insurance (dashed grey line, AsymEC).
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Table 2. Factor analysis model including loadings and the percentage of variance of the rotated factors.
Variables
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Expectations Asymmetric information Yield variability Commercial effort
Areawheat (1000 ha) 0.81
Rainfed (fraction)







Proportion (%) 49.5 19.5 17.5 13.5
Blanks represent abs(loading) < 0.5.  KMO test value = 0.73
Table 3. Parameter estimates in the regression models for the proportion of the wheat cultivated area that was 
insured (Insuredwheat) and the proportion of insured area in option basic with respect to the total insured 
area in 2011 and 2012 in Castilla y León. Observations are per county and year.
Model Model – Explained variable
Explanatory variables Insuredwheat InsuredB option Basic / Insuredwheat
Areawheat (1000 ha) 0.08***
1 ---
GapZ (Mg/ha) 0.03* ---
CVYa (–) --- ---
AsymB (-) -0.28*** 0.78***
N 72 72
R2adj 0.30 0.17
1--- Not significant; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Discussion 
What is driving farmer’s agricultural insurance 
choice?
Premium subsidies are the most common public 
intervention to incentive crop insurance demand 
(Babcock & Hart, 2005; Claassen et al., 2005; Garrido 
& Zilberman, 2008). In the case of wheat insurance in 
Castilla y León, and for option Extended (the one with 
the largest guarantees), most of the insured area was 
gathered by Module 2, despite subsidies in Module 1 
being higher than in Module 2. The second most selected 
insurance alternative was Module P, the option Basic, 
with the lowest premium subsidy (Table S1 [suppl.]). 
Both in Module 2 and Module P, loss compensation is 
evaluated per plot. This suggests that the accuracy in 
setting insured yield is decisive in the willingness of the 
farmers of contracting insurance, being subsidies less 
important in driving farmers’ insurance demand.
Our results show that insurance demand was higher 
in counties with larger areas cultivated with winter 
wheat (Table 3). Moreover, higher insurance demand 
is expected in vast regions with low farmers’ density 
where commercial efforts by insurance companies 
might be profitable; one successful sale would yield a 
higher selling commission. Moreover, regions showing 
stronger crop specialization, and thus lower income 
sources, incur farm larger revenue risks, being crop 
insurance an interesting alternative risk management 
tool (Niewuwoudt et al., 1985; Cabas et al., 2008). 
Enjolras et al. (2014) and Santeramo et al (2016) 
also found farm size to have an influence in farmers’ 
willingness to select risk management tools, including 
crop insurance. They argue that that this is related to the 
higher exposition of smaller farms to changes in their 
income than larger ones, and to fixed costs associated to 
the enrolment in the insurance system.
Information asymmetry indicators (AsymB, AsymE 
and AsymEC) were also included in the analysis as a 
measure of farmers’ information advantages. Results 
show higher insurance demand related to a lower 
AsymB, but a higher proportion of the insured area 
under the option Basic for higher AsymB. This suggests 
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that, in regions with lower asymmetric information 
and better adjusted insurance parameters, farmers 
have a higher tendency to contract insurance, and to 
do it under a wider coverage (option Extended). But 
the causality reversed: increasing insurance demand 
might help decreasing asymmetric information 
as the probability of participation of less risky 
producers increases, mitigating adverse selection 
(Shaik et al., 2008). Properly calibrated insurance 
parameters would make insuring more attractive to 
a higher number of farmers.
Are crop models useful for crop insurance 
assessment?
GapW was the highest yield gap found among the 
gaps included in this analysis. This result suggests 
that, as expected, it is more accurate to calibrate 
insurance parameters based on actual reported 
yields instead of attainable yields (or simulated 
water limited yields), and therefore on historical 
data rather than using crop models. Otherwise 
farmers’ yields would be overestimated.
Mean GapW in CyL was 1.01 Mg/ha. This differs 
from those reported in Boogaard et al. (2013), 
within an analysis for the whole of Europe using the 
crop model WOFOST. They calculated Yw between 
5 and 6 Mg/ha and GapW between 3 and 4 Mg/ha 
in CyL. Therefore, mean Yw was about 1 Mg/ha 
higher and mean Ya was about 1.5 Mg/ha lower than 
reported in this work. These differences might be 
related to the accuracy in calibration and the scale 
of application.
Nevertheless, the use of crop models might be 
useful in designing new insurance packages when no 
historical data is available or to evaluate scenarios 
of expected changes, such as under expected climate 
change. In that case, it is suggested that yield gaps 
be estimated and considered when using simulated 
attainable yields.
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